A few years ago, the idea that a 911 call would be answered first not by police officers but by propeller-mounted cameras seemed futuristic. In 2025, Drone as First Responder (DFR) programs stopped being experimental and became the new normal for many cities. Drones are integrated into real-time crime management centers, launch automatically, and increasingly operate without direct human oversight.
The official goal is “enhanced situational awareness.” The real consequence is the scaling of police surveillance, which is increasingly difficult to monitor.
A DFR program is a fleet of camera-equipped drones stationed on dedicated platforms throughout a city. After an emergency call, a drone can:
Unlike traditional patrols, a drone never “gets tired,” doesn’t require breaks, and can surveil private spaces—yards, rooftops, balconies, and people’s movements—from above.
A key catalyst for the explosive growth of DFR in 2025 was the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). New, simplified rules for flights beyond the operator’s line of sight triggered a flood of approvals. Within two months, more than 400 permits were granted—nearly a third of all permits issued in previous years.
At the same time, federal authorities took controversial steps: on one hand, they promoted national drone industry growth; on the other, they effectively blocked a major manufacturer (DJI) without transparent security audits. This opens the market to other companies but does not resolve the core question: what are the limits of acceptable surveillance?
2025 marked a turning point in the transition from “operator-controlled” drones to autonomous systems. New models launch, navigate, and return without constant operator involvement, relying on algorithms and artificial intelligence.
This fundamentally changes the accountability balance:
Combined with other technologies—video analytics, predictive policing, license plate recognition—drones become part of an integrated surveillance ecosystem, not just standalone tools.
One of the most concerning trends of 2025 is the integration of DFR with other systems. Companies combine drones with:
As a result, drone footage ceases to be just “images.” It becomes data that can be analyzed, compared, stored for years, and used for secondary purposes far from the original emergency call.
Flying cameras have unique properties:
Additional “payloads”—thermal sensors, spotlights, loudspeakers, and in some cases coercive tools—expand drone capabilities while shrinking privacy space.
Despite widespread DFR deployment, transparency remains minimal. Information on flights, data retention policies, and actual use scenarios is often accessible only through public records requests.
This creates a dangerous gap: communities live under drones but do not know who is using them, how, or why.
For countries actively implementing “smart city” technologies, 2025’s experience is a warning. DFR is not a neutral technology. It is an infrastructure that:
Without clear rules, independent oversight, and real accountability, “first responder” drones can quickly become the first line of total control.
The topic of Drone as First Responder (DFR) is particularly relevant for Ukraine. Since 2022, amid war and the active development of “smart cities,” state authorities and municipalities have increasingly considered unmanned systems as a tool for public safety. However, deploying drones without clear rules and independent oversight creates risks not only of a technological nature but also social and political.
First, drones can monitor private spaces, track the movement of people and vehicles in real time, often without judicial oversight. For Ukrainian cities with high population density and active civic engagement, this implies a potential violation of the right to privacy and freedom of movement.
Second, system automation, where decisions are made by algorithms rather than humans, raises serious questions of accountability. Who is responsible for errors, false alarms, or unlawful use of data? In Ukraine, the legal framework for mass video surveillance and autonomous systems is still in its early stages. Without transparent rules, these technologies could easily be used for purposes other than intended — such as monitoring political activity, protests, or targeting minority groups.
Third, integrating drones with other surveillance systems — cameras, ALPR, video analytics — creates a unified monitoring ecosystem. This means the airspace over cities could become an additional “layer” of control, where data collection and processing occur unnoticed by citizens. The psychological effect of constant surveillance, combined with technologies like thermal cameras or spotlights, may significantly restrict individual freedom and influence civic engagement.
Finally, Ukrainian society already demonstrates a high level of digital awareness. Activists, media, and human rights defenders monitor the deployment of new technologies by police and municipalities. The 2025 experience in the U.S. serves as a warning for Ukraine: without legislative frameworks, transparent policies, and independent oversight, drone first responders risk becoming the first line of total control rather than a tool for safety.
Conclusion: Ukraine must define the boundaries for the permissible use of drones, establish principles of transparency and accountability, and ensure that technology serves safety — not surveillance and the restriction of human rights.
2025 showed that the question is no longer whether drones will be used by police. The question is under what conditions and with which safeguards.
Technology that launches automatically must also stop automatically where human rights begin. If not addressed now, urban skies could become another space where privacy exists only in theory.
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Violetta Loseva
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